When discussing Gareth Southgate’s commendable tenure with England, the conversation often highlights the high calibre of players he has at his disposal—significantly superior to those from a decade ago, for instance.
This observation is entirely valid. A manager’s performance can only be assessed based on the resources available to him. However, perhaps even more advantageous than the current quality of English footballers is the exceptional standard of managers.
Historically, England has boasted great footballing generations. The ‘golden generation’ included players who ranked 1st (Michael Owen), 2nd (David Beckham, Frank Lampard) and 3rd (Steven Gerrard) in the Ballon d’Or voting, for example. The 2004-06 team had few evident weaknesses in outfield positions, whereas just this summer, Southgate was searching for genuine left-sided width and a consistent partner for Declan Rice in midfield.
Nevertheless, Southgate has been managing during an era when the Premier League has attracted top coaching talent from around the globe. The issue for England during the golden generation was not a lack of individual skill but a deficiency in tactical acumen. English players were rigid and occasionally naïve.
Nowadays, English players are familiar with playing in a range of systems, so that can’t be used as an excuse anymore. This was particularly evident during Southgate’s first major tournament at the 2018 World Cup.
Southgate’s 3-5-2 formation was progressive in several ways. England had not frequently employed a three-man defence for about twenty years, but the method gained traction following Antonio Conte’s success with Chelsea in the Premier League, making it a more accepted strategy.
When Southgate positioned Jordan Henderson — who was previously seen as an energetic box-to-box player — in the holding role, he was drawing inspiration from Jurgen Klopp, who was using Henderson similarly at that time. Additionally, by completing the midfield trio with Jesse Lingard and Dele Alli, both perceived as No 10s, Southgate essentially adopted the ‘free eights’ tactic popularised by Pep Guardiola.
Naturally, England didn’t quite reach the footballing heights of those elite teams. However, with an unconventional — and rather bold — starting lineup, they outclassed opponents while maintaining defensive solidity. Certain attacking sequences, especially with Sterling, Lingard, and Alli making runs off Kane, rendered England genuinely thrilling to watch for the first time in many years.
One concern with appointing Southgate initially was his significant lack of experience as a senior manager. His three-year stint at Middlesbrough from 2006 to 2009 feels almost like ancient history. His commendable job as the England Under-21 manager was more about player development than outsmarting rival coaches.
There have been occasions where Southgate seemed to struggle with tactical acumen to make in-game adjustments.
The clearest instance of this was in 2018 when England were leading Croatia 1-0 and on course for the World Cup final. As England dropped deeper, their 3-5-2 formation morphed into a 5-3-2, and Croatia’s primary threat emerged from the flanks. Specifically, Croatia posed significant danger down their right side.
Luka Modric’s synergy with right-back Sime Vrsaljko had been a significant aspect of their strategy throughout the tournament. Conversely, on the opposite side, Ivan Strinic posed far less of a threat as a full-back. Croatia frequently directed their play towards the formidable Vrsaljko, targeting the outside of England’s midfield. Alli was given the duty of neutralising both Vrsaljko and Modric, while left wing-back Ashley Young was held back by Croatia’s winger.
A straightforward solution could have been to abandon the two-striker formation. Sterling, operating through the centre, would have been well-suited to shift to the left and help counter Vrsaljko. Danny Welbeck, known for his tactical reliability, could have been brought in to fulfil that role. However, this change never materialised. Ultimately, Vrsaljko’s cross set up Croatia’s equaliser. Disheartened, England failed to bounce back and lost 2-1.
By Euro 2020, Southgate exhibited greater adaptability. England were at ease with either a back four or a back three, allowing Southgate to switch formations seamlessly, potentially surprising their opponents. This level of tactical versatility would have been quite rare in earlier times.
The issue in question was whether Southgate made the correct decisions. In the semi-final against Denmark, who employed a 3-4-3 formation that put pressure on opponents through wide areas, Southgate unexpectedly chose a back four instead of mirroring the Danish system. England conceded an early goal but were assisted back into contention by some unusual tactical choices from Kasper Hjulmund. These included substituting Denmark’s top performers on the night and ultimately ending the match with only 10 players due to injury, even though he had the opportunity to use six substitutes as the game went into extra time. England persevered and secured a 2-1 victory.
The final against Italy followed. It seemed an appropriate moment to use a back four formation. Italy’s setup turned into a front five when in possession, with their left-back advancing to join the attack, but Leonardo Spinazzola was sidelined with an injury, making Emerson Palmieri a lesser threat.
A more daring manager might have opted for a 4-2-3-1 formation, positioning Bukayo Saka on the right wing and instructing him to fall back into a five-man defence. In fact, this was the precise strategy Southgate employed during the Euro 2024 quarter-final against Switzerland, where Saka excelled.
However, Southgate chose a conservative approach with a back three. It was difficult to criticise the decision when one wing-back, Kieran Trippier, assisted the other, Luke Shaw, for an early goal. Yet, after that initial success, England produced very little; the back three morphed into a back five, and they eventually buckled under Italian pressure. The match was decided by penalties, with Saka unfortunately missing his kick—a twist of fate, given he should have started and likely wouldn’t have been on the pitch after 120 minutes.
One of the most intriguing aspects of Southgate’s tenure is that the one instance where England did not advance past the quarter-finals arguably featured his most effective strategy in eight years. In a World Cup clash with reigning champions France 18 months ago, Southgate’s tactic of having Henderson overlap Bukayo Saka on the right was highly successful. Saka caused chaos on that side, frequently cutting inside, creating opportunities, and was unlucky not to draw more fouls. The expected goals metric favoured England, although Kane’s penalty miss proved costly.
Euro 2024 posed more difficulties for the England manager than some might suggest due to various shortcomings within the team. Yet, it shouldn’t have been so arduous.
At Euro 2024, there were two versions of England — one that underperformed during the group stage but still managed to maintain a strong defensive record and achieve the kind of results that often lead to success in international competitions.
During the knockout stage, England was outclassed by Slovakia and Switzerland, despite both teams being considered weaker. Southgate merits some recognition for the tactical shift against Switzerland, which successfully neutralised their potent left side, and there was an evident improvement in the semi-final against the Netherlands.
However, the overall lack of quality in this tournament, especially in terms of build-up play, pressing, attacking formations, or positional rotations, has made England appear quite mediocre. The decision not to make substitutions against Slovakia was almost unfathomable given England’s clear advantage in squad depth.
Southgate’s role has evolved considerably since his debut tournament in 2018. He now had creative talents like Phil Foden and Jude Bellingham at his disposal, instead of industrious players like Lingard and Alli. Additionally, he faced more gaps in his starting XI compared to six years ago. This posed more complex tactical challenges for the manager, who struggled to find clear solutions.
However, deep down, Southgate is not primarily a tactician. He focuses more on fostering off-field unity and ensuring the team’s morale is high. It was intriguing to observe him giving a post-match interview after the 2-1 loss to Spain, with Arsene Wenger meandering in the background. Southgate resembled Wenger in his later Arsenal years — immensely likeable, a diplomat, reflective during press conferences, and someone invested in people’s growth.
Yet, just as Wenger often seemed puzzled by Arsenal’s victories or defeats, one is seldom convinced that Southgate identified the correct tactical approaches. They appear more akin to directors of football rather than traditional football managers.
Nonetheless, in 2016, following the disappointment against Iceland at the European Championship and the humiliating Sam Allardyce episode, that was exactly what England required. Southgate must be acknowledged as a crucial figure in England’s resurgence on the international stage. His significant contribution to English football comes from not merely staying a pundit, as he did for several years, but taking on important roles within the Football Association.
If more individuals like Southgate were active in English football, the sport would thrive significantly. However, at this stage, his appropriate position within the FA’s leadership is beyond the touchline.
Nevertheless, his successor will step into an enviable scenario, focusing on refinements rather than extensive overhauls. Should England triumph in either of the upcoming major tournaments, Southgate will rightfully earn substantial recognition.
