The retreat of the International Olympic Committee from esports should not be seen as a rejection of gaming or its enormous global appeal. Rather, it reflects the limits of a fragmented ecosystem dominated by publishers and lacking the governance structure expected of Olympic sport. The IOC’s failure was not in embracing esports, but in doing so without a sufficiently robust institutional framework. The issue was never entering esports — it was entering through the wrong door.
In October 2025, the IOC and Saudi Arabia ended their 12-year partnership to develop the Olympic Esports Games, just 14 months after unveiling the initiative during the 2024 Summer Olympics. Riyadh had been scheduled to host the inaugural edition in 2027, but both sides ultimately chose to go their separate ways. The IOC later announced plans to pursue a new strategy and partnership model, effectively acknowledging that the original project lacked a sufficiently solid foundation.
The core problem was governance. Esports are not failing because they are digital, modern or commercially driven; the challenge is that the global ecosystem does not function as an independent sports system. In many cases, publishers own the game itself while simultaneously controlling licences, rules, competition formats, calendars, access and integrity mechanisms. They act as both stakeholder and regulator. Rather than destroying the Olympic esports project, the IOC exposed the governance vacuum at its centre.
Unlike traditional sports — where federations do not own the ball, field or discipline as a closed commercial product — esports publishers frequently maintain full control over the competitive ecosystem and determine how much external oversight is permitted. While commercially effective, that structure does not align neatly with Olympic standards, which require independence, accountability, harmonised rules, anti-doping systems, integrity safeguards, eligibility criteria and national representation. Without independent oversight and internationally recognised governing bodies, esports remain closer to a commercial entertainment product than a true sports system.
The failed Saudi partnership highlighted these structural weaknesses. The collaboration was expected to accelerate the project through funding, infrastructure, visibility and operational support. However, its collapse demonstrated that the Olympic Esports Games lacked a durable institutional backbone. When the strategic partner withdrew, so too did the illusion that a stable global structure already existed to support the project.
The situation was further complicated by controversy surrounding Ng Ser Miang, who was closely associated with the initiative. Questions emerged over alleged conflicts of interest linked to Virtual Taekwondo, a title developed by Refract Technologies, a company reportedly connected to his family circle. Although the IOC maintained that Ng had acted within its rules and that no wrongdoing had been established, the controversy weakened perceptions of independence and further eroded confidence in a project already struggling with governance concerns.
Saudi Arabia, however, has not stepped away from esports. The country continues to invest heavily in gaming as part of its broader strategy for sport, entertainment and economic diversification. The Esports World Cup announced a record prize pool of $70 million for its 2025 edition, featuring 24 games and a clear ambition to position Riyadh as a global esports hub. That demonstrates that the issue was never solely financial. Investment can create events, attract publishers and generate visibility, but it cannot substitute for an independent and credible governance structure.
One pathway the IOC failed to fully embrace was the International Esports Federation (IESF). While its model does not eliminate publisher influence, it is built on principles more aligned with international sport: national federations, territorial representation, regulated competitions and shared governance standards. If esports are to become part of the Olympic movement, they will need governance structures — not simply publisher-driven ecosystems.
Meanwhile, the Global Esports Federation (GEF) appears increasingly unlikely to lead a credible reconstruction of the Olympic esports project. The IOC’s strategic error was not recognising the importance of gaming — a move that made sense given esports’ appeal to younger audiences and its status as one of the world’s largest cultural communities. The mistake was attempting to build an Olympic product on commercial and geopolitical foundations before resolving the institutional questions: who governs, who regulates, who represents athletes, who guarantees integrity and who ultimately sets the rules.
The IOC’s withdrawal should therefore be viewed as a reset rather than a final rejection of esports. Any Olympic future for competitive gaming will require governance before growth, independence before spectacle and structure before investment. The Olympic Esports Games did not collapse because the concept lacked potential. They faltered because the current global esports model is not yet built to meet the standards of Olympic sport. Until that changes, esports will need to adapt to the structures and principles of organised sport — rather than expecting sport to lower its own standards.
